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A Realistic Universe. An Introduction to Metaphysics. By JOHN ELOF BOODIN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916.—pp. xxii, 412.

"This volume on metaphysics is the sequel of a volume on the theory of knowledge, entitled 'Truth and Reality,' which was published in 1911. The two volumes furnish a survey of the field of general philosophy from the point of view of pragmatic realism" (p. vii). A large portion of the book has seen light before in the form of articles, and, while the contents do betray occasionally the character of a collection, Professor Boodin insists that his volume is in no sense a compilation of articles, but that it was early conceived as a systematic unity.

It is in fact an outline of a metaphysical system, motivated by a desire to translate the age-long problems of metaphysics into terms of real present human issues. This desire, evidenced throughout the book, inspires the author's formulation of his procedure: "As applied to metaphysics the pragmatic method means that we must judge the nature of reality, in its various grades and complexities, by the consequences to the realization of human purposes, instead of by *a priori* assumptions" (p. vii). The plan of the book is stated twice: in a rhapsodic prospective chapter entitled "The Divine Fivefold Truth," and in a more technical retrospect, "The Five Attributes," which closes the book. In opposition to Spinoza, whom he characterizes as an idealist in ethics and a materialist in epistemology, Professor Boodin proposes a new doctrine of attributes, using the classic term to designate the ultimate types of difference which reality makes to our reflective conduct. He recognizes five such ultimates: Being, Consciousness, Space, Time, and Form. The five parts of the book are concerned with this fivefold analysis of the universe.

The two classic metaphysical hypotheses, of independent substances and of the idealistic absolute, appear to the author inadequate; in place of any such "everlasting fixtures" he stresses process as the real ultimate. Substances are mere abstractions of the relative uniformities and constancies observed in the stream of processes. The absolute of idealism is an hypostatization of finite human experience. The real world is not a world of static entities and things-in-themselves. There is no substrate except the interlocking, interdependent energies." (p. 54). Nor are the energy-systems themselves to be hypostatized. "Energy is what it does. Any other assumption is suicidal at the outset" (p. 33). Professor Boodin calls his position Pragmatic Energism. Each energy system involves certain variables, a certain form or organizing relation, and recurrence (the pragmatic equivalent of 'substance').

"Reality is what it manifests itself to be in its varying contexts" (p. 54). But this does not mean for Professor Boodin that experience comprehends reality. Experience is not self-sufficient. Actual experience does not account for its own continuity, either in space or in time; and 'possible experience' only hides the problem: "If it means anything when pressed home it is that experience sometimes leans upon processes which are not experience" (p. 17). Things are objective not in that we do acknowledge them but in that we *must* acknowledge them. "Human nature as cognitive does not create qualities, though it is an indispensable condition for their significance" (p. 79). The failure to recognize this distinction Professor Boodin regards as a characteristic sin of idealism. Between dogmatism and absolute agnosticism he proposes relative agnosticism. We do not know all the properties of things; yet our knowledge is of the real, so far as it goes. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not a distinction between the real and the apparent; the basis of the distinction is instrumental and relative, not absolute. What is primary for one purpose may be secondary for another purpose. The test is always pragmatic. "Qualities must be considered as objective, if they enable us to identify and predict the things with which we must deal" (p. 87).

The second part of the volume is devoted to the problem of Consciousness and Mind. The author objects to the definition of consciousness in terms of cognitive meaning or logical relations. Consciousness does not create meaning; we do not create or add to the meaning of Homer or Euclid by becoming conscious of them. Nor is consciousness to be regarded as a relation between terms figuring within or without the field of experience. It is a fact over and beyond relations, whether logical or energetic. It is not energy, but it makes energy aware of itself as meaningful; it is not a relation, but is bound up with the subjective significance of relations. By stating consciousness as an independent variable, an ultimate non-energetic fact, Professor Boodin hopes to retain the simplicity of materialism without the contradiction of trying to convert energy into non-energy, to save the duplication of parallelism, and to accomplish the intent of the interaction theory "by showing the energetic character of the conative processes, their efficacious relation to the other energies of nature, while we get rid of the absurdity of having a non-energetic consciousness interact with an energetic world" (p. 129).

This emphasis upon consciousness as an independent non-energetic variable while it cuts into materialism on the one hand, cuts into subjective idealism on the other; for the existence of mental processes is as little dependent upon our consciousness of them as is the existence of material processes. "Consciousness and mind are conceptually separable facts" (p. 132). We no more make our mind by becoming conscious of it than we make the mind of Homer, or the processes of any other energy system, mechanical, electrical, organic, or social kinetic. Electricity makes certain differences to extended and ponderable processes; even so, mental processes are related to physical processes in ways which are investigable. These are problems of the interrelations of energy systems. But the problem of mind and matter is not the problem of consciousness. "Consciousness . . . makes only one difference to reality. Under certain energetic conditions it makes the difference of awareness" (p. 135). "It is not a link in the chain of causality, interacting with the events, physical or mental, but by its presence in the conative stream, the distinguishing of physical and mental becomes possible. . . . It is more like a medium, in which the events travel, than like a cause" (p. 138).

But, if consciousness is not mind, what then is mind? What is mental? Professor Boodin attempts to answer this question in Chapter X. Mind is conative constitution; "The will in its various stages is mental, and with it is bound up its pure affective tone of agreeable and disagreeable. The remainder of what we speak of as in the mind we must regard as physical" (p. 174). Conation and feeling are not themselves experiences. "Experience is only another name for the unique relation which we call interest; and I cannot see why the will is dependent for its existence upon noticing itself, or being noticed perhaps by another will, any more than the tree is thus dependent" (p. 174). We have no warrant for treating the self as an external entity, identical, unitary, free, or abstractly individual. The self is as constant as its activities and contents, as its ability to satisfy social expectancies; an identical self is an identical will. The self is ideally, but not actually, unified. Activity and freedom must mean, not chance, but the realization of aims in a world of predictable processes, a world in which purposive processes may control and make a difference to processes of impulse and impression. And mind "requires the unique tension of an intersubjective field, a conflict with another mind, to raise it to consciousness of itself" (p. 195).

Parts III and IV deal respectively with Space and Time. Serial

Space, Professor Boodin maintains, is indeed ideal, but the pure space of physics and astronomy is real. Geometrical construction is a matter of logic, to be conducted like any other free logical inquiry; yet even geometry, in continuing to assume free mobility as one of its few remaining axioms, presupposes pure space as objective to serial construction. If we conceive distance as real,—and we must, else things would have to coalesce or interpenetrate,—then pure space must be real. Space is no more subjective than motion or change, and its properties cannot be determined *a priori*, but must be ascertained in the same empirical way as we ascertain the properties of things. Time also is real and ultimate. We cannot treat it as an illusion, for how could the illusion of time and change arise in a static world? Time is not duration; the latter is indeed its antipodes, the eternity aspect of experience. "The time character is bound up with the coming and going, with the passing and novelty of the process" (p. 258). Serial time, like serial space, is ideal; but the serial character of time is secondary; its primary character is the fleeting, flying, evanescent character of experience, and that is assuredly real. To be sure, time is not the whole of reality, but an independent variable or attribute of it, just as stuff or energy is an independent variable. Between the Eleatic and Bergson, our author maintains the relativity alike of constancy and of flux.

The universe has been described so far as a process of energy systems, involving change and transformation (time), translation and free mobility (space), and awareness (consciousness). But what the author frankly recognizes as his most difficult problem still awaits us. For the question still remains: Does the process have direction, is there validity in the flux, does it disclose standards, criteria, order? This is the problem of Form, the fifth attribute of the author's universe. True realists in the past—Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza and Leibniz—have recognized the importance of form, but they have not been clear as to its nature. Form has been confused with activity; it has been set over against matter, and has accordingly been regarded as a quasi-causal agency entering into and transforming the world of things. But, for Professor Boodin, "Form has to to do, not with transformation, but with *formulation*—with the possibility of defining our situations in the terms of clear and distinct principles" (p. 330). Measured in terms of the world of sense-stuff, form is nothing. It is not itself structure or stuff or thought, but it determines the survival of the structures of stuff and ideals. So regarded, form shows itself to be eternal. Since it is not stuff of any kind, it is not subject to time and process; having no content, it is not itself subject to transmutation.

Professor Boodin's procedure at this stage (Chapter XVII: "Form and the Ought") is insistently reminiscent of Kant. One is moved to suspect that Ought and Categorical Imperative and Kingdom of Ends will here also be exalted to *Wolkenkukusheim* and that Lampe will once more have his Critique. For the question arises, how an Eternal Form can express the direction and validity of a transmutable world. If the author found earlier one of his arguments for the reality of time in the consideration that the very illusion of time and change would be inexplicable in a static universe, here he is confronted by a similar puzzle: How can the formal constitution of "the protean variations of evolution" be eternally constant? Already we had learned that flux and constancy are alike relative in this world of ours. But here the world of stuff and process is contrasted with the world of form; and, while "the universe does not indeed become pure form; the logical dualism remains," yet "pure form sets the final survival conditions of process" (p. 332). To be sure, as the author himself declares, it is only confused thinking which supposes that, in order to insure the reality of form, we must have a static universe. "To have truth and worth in the universe it is not necessary to be 'stoppers of the universe'" (p. 332). But, if the flux on the one hand and eternal form on the other, though contrasted, are to be regarded as different aspects of the same universe, a conceivable synthesis of their apparent incompatibility appears highly desirable. Indeed one is moved to inquire, in what sense form can be regarded as one of the 'attributes,' in the author's use of the term—"the ultimate types of difference which reality makes to our reflective conduct" (p. 391). What difference does Eternal Form make to our finite experience? The author answers: "Form is creative, but it creates not by production but by elimination. It is creative as the artist is creative, *i. e.*, by selection" (p. 333). If this means that form brings forth nothing new, but suppresses and annihilates much that is old, then it is hard to see what purpose is served by this notion of creativeness, or in what essential manner the author has improved upon the Aristotelian conception, which he criticizes, when he has substituted the negative for the positive agency of form.

Throughout his book Professor Boodin has been protesting against *a priori* assumptions and insisting upon the empirical observation of the plain facts. Here also he himself asks and answers the question: What evidence do we have for the existence of absolute direction in the finite structural world? "As we have developed the sense of extensity with complex instinctive coordinations to meet the reality of space; as we have developed the sense of duration with complex structural adjustments for measuring the flight of the time-process; as we have developed the feeling of effort to symbolize energy, so we have developed the feeling for form with its tendencies and sentiments, and its sanctions in social institutions, to meet the demands of the universe upon us" (p. 334). But, if we are capable of meeting these demands of the universe, if experience does disclose to us the nature of reality, as process and as eternal significance, is not the language of experience, if not self-sufficient, at any rate somewhat more sufficient philosophically than Professor Boodin is ready to grant to the idealist? His own procedure is not invariably as incompatible with that of the objective idealist as his words may indicate. To quote only one example: "The concept of validity has a real basis only in a world which has form. If the process of the universe is merely a chance affair, no ideals can be enforced, or be binding, whether mechanical or ethical. Science in such a world would have no guarantee for its ideals of simplicity and unity any more than ethics for its ideals of worth" (p. 341). But is it not apparent that a world so conceived is a world in which experience with its ideal demands is genuinely instrumental, indeed a world which not only discloses its real constitution in the language of experience, but whose constitution itself is fundamentally experiential? To realists, pragmatic and 'analytic,' Experience seems to declare out of Professor Boodin's book: "When Me you fly, I am the wings."

The chapter on "The Identity of the Ideals" has for its thesis "that the ideals of life, of truth and beauty and virtue, are identical as regards form or the demands which they set to the concrete will" (p. 307). In Chapter XVIII, "Teleological Idealism," the author examines briefly the mechanistic, finalistic, and vitalistic theories of evolution, endeavors to combine mechanism and finalism, and devotes a section to the problem of Matter and God. If the reviewer only refers to the contents of these two chapters, it is not because he has not found them thought-provoking enough for longer discussion. Indeed Professor Boodin's whole book is sufficiently vital to invite criticism. It is in no sense a nondescript work, but has been conceived in honest genuine thinking and is therefore naturally involved in genuine and open issues. It is not invariably convincing, but throughout it stimulates philosophical thinking,—and perhaps, after all, nothing better can be said of an introduction to metaphysics.

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